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Abstract—There is an increasing trend for businesses to mi-
grate their systems towards the cloud. Security concerns that
arise when outsourcing data and computation to the cloud include
data confidentiality and privacy. Given that a tremendous amount
of data is being generated everyday from plethora of devices
equipped with sensing capabilities, we focus on the problem
of access controls over live streams of data based on triggers
or sliding windows, which is a distinct and more challenging
problem than access control over archival data. Specifically, we
investigate secure mechanisms for outsourcing access control
enforcement for stream data to the cloud. We devise a system
that allows data owners to specify fine-grained policies associated
with their data streams, then to encrypt the streams and relay
them to the cloud for live processing and storage for future
use. The access control policies are enforced by the cloud,
without the latter learning about the data, while ensuring that
unauthorized access is not feasible. To realize these ends, we
employ a novel cryptographic primitive, namely proxy-based
attribute-based encryption, which not only provides security
but also allows the cloud to perform expensive computations
on behalf of the users. Our approach is holistic, in that these
controls are integrated with an XML based framework (XACML)
for high-level management of policies. Experiments with our
prototype demonstrate the feasibility of such mechanisms, and
early evaluations suggest graceful scalability with increasing
numbers of policies, data streams and users.
I. INTRODUCTION
An enormous amount of data is being generated contin-
uously, by organizations and individuals carrying out their
day-to-day activities, as well as by dedicated sensing and
monitoring infrastructures. Examples include financial ser-
vices for monitoring stock prices [6], sensor networks for
meteorological, environmental [3], battle field and traffic con-
trol [9], [10] monitoring. As personal devices, especially those
equipped with sensing capabilities, are enjoying an unprece-
dented growth, they are also becoming a prominent source of
stream data. Applications such as participatory sensing [22],
[28] and personal health monitoring [1] collect continuous data
from sensors fitted in smart phones or in other mobile devices.
The abundance of such data brings many new opportunities,
such as real time decision making and resource management
at various scales - from personal area or home networks to
smart planet. Often, these applications assume sharing and
mash-up of data from multiple sources, possibly created and
owned by different stake holders. One important requirement
is to equip data owners with adequate control for determining
different granularity in which the sharing is done with various
parties. Another requirement is the infrastructure over which
such sharing can be done in a scalable manner.
One can presume that the need for a scalable infrastruc-
ture can be readily realized thanks to the advent of cloud
computing. Businesses are moving their computing systems
cloud-ward, availing themselves of the elastic resources, ease
of management and good cost-benefit trade-off [11], [25],
[18], [38]. While recent advances in the technologies have
given users more control and better performance [13], [37],
limited progress has been made towards security guarantees,
particularly vis-a-vis sharing data with multiple other parties
in possibly different granularity. In general, many argue [11],
[35], [34] that security remains one of the biggest obstacles
to be overcome before the potential of the cloud can be fully
realized.
This paper is an important step exploring the design space
of outsourcing the enforcement of access control of live data
streams to the cloud. Our goal is to design a system that
supports fine-grained access control policies in which most of
the expensive computations are done by the cloud. We assume
that a data owner outsources its stream data to an untrusted
cloud. The system must allow the data owner to specify fine-
grained access control policies for the data stream. It must
ensure security with respect to access control enforcement, i.e.
no unauthorized access is allowed even if the cloud colludes
with dishonest data users. Finally, the system must protect
privacy of the outsourced data.
Access control for stream data is more challenging than for
traditional non-stream (archival) data. In archival databases,
access is defined on views [36] which are constructed by
querying the databases. Since views are static and can be
pre-computed, this technique is not applicable to stream data
because of the potentially infinite size and queries being
continuous and are carried out over newly arrived data. Most
critically, the nature of stream data demands support for
more fine-grained policies, especially those involving temporal
constraints [17]. Specifically, most policies can be categorized
as trigger or sliding window policies:
- Trigger: A user is given access to a data record when its
content satisfy a certain condition. For example, in a personal
health monitoring system [1], a user tracks his blood pressure,
heart rate, blood sugar, etc. using a portable device at regular
intervals. On the one hand, such data is crucial for doctors to
monitor patient recovery and to make early diagnosis. On the
other hand, the user is concerned with his privacy and would
not wish to disclose all the measurements. As a result, he can
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2specify a policy dictating that certain doctors have access to
his data only when his blood pressure exceeds a threshold.
- Sliding window: A user is given summaries of the data
over specific windows, as opposed to having access to raw
data. For example, a financial company monitoring stock
prices every 0.5 second can sell its raw data for a very high
price. It can also offer more coarse-grained packages at lower
prices which contain only the average stock prices over s-
second interval (s > 0.5). This gives the data owner greater
flexibility in managing and generating profit from its data.
A naive design to realize these goals would be to encrypt
the data using a symmetric encryption scheme, store it on
the cloud and distribute the decryption keys to authorized
users. Such a system [34], [27] relies on the data owner
for access control enforcement, while the cloud acts only
as a transit storage provider. Use of a more advanced en-
cryption scheme, namely attribute-based encryption (ABE)
scheme [23], [14], can help relieve the data owner from much
of the key management tasks. However, ABE deals only with
individual data objects and therefore can not naturally support
sliding window policies. Additionally, ABE effectively pushes
the access control management task towards the end-user
who needs to check all the ciphertexts and discard that that
will result in invalid decryption. Such a modus operandi is
inefficient and does not scale for large systems with many
different data streams.
In this paper, we propose to use a proxy attribute-based
encryption scheme [24] for trigger policies, and extend it
with support for sliding window policies. Out system ensures
access control while also offloading expensive computations
to the cloud. Furthermore, we decouple the task of policy
management from security enforcement by using the XACML
framework [4]. The cloud handles this task seamlessly, and as
a result the end-user only receives and decrypts ciphertexts of
his authorized data. Adding an explicit layer of management
on top of ABE helps the system scale better with more data
streams and more policies. In summary, our main contributes
are as follows:
1. We propose an extension to an ABE scheme which
provides support for sliding window access control.
2. We design a system allowing data owner to outsource
stream data and access control enforcement to the cloud. The
system supports both trigger and sliding window policies in
a secure manner. It is also scalable, in the sense that most of
the expensive operations are done by the cloud. We achieve
both security and scalability by combining novel cryptographic
primitives with the standard XACML framework for policy
management.
3. We implement a prototype of our system. Through
preliminary evaluation, we find that the overhead is reasonable.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The next
section presents the system and security model. Section III
details the cryptographic protocols. It is followed by the
design for policy management. We present our prototype and
preliminary evaluation in Section V. Related work is discussed
in Section VI before we conclude in Section VII.
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Fig. 1: The context: (1) negotiation phase: the owner and the
user agree on an access control policy (2) outsourcing phase:
the owner encrypts its data and forwards to the cloud (3)
relaying phase: the cloud processes and forwards the data to
the authorized users.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Our system consists of a number of data owners (or
owners), one cloud provider and a number of data users
(or users). As depicted in Figure 1, a data owner generates
a stream of data and sends it to the cloud. Several users
interested in the data will retrieve it through the cloud. The
owner and users agree on the access policy before-hand. In
summary, the data is outsourced to the cloud where it will be
stored, managed and distributed to a set of users.
A. Data Model
For simplicity, we assume that data generated by the owner
are key-value tuples. A stream D is a sequence of (ki, vi)
for i = 0, 1, 2, .. where ki, vi are integers and the value vi
belongs to a known, finite domain. In a participatory sensing
application, the ki may represent a geographical location
while v may represent a measurement of air pollution. In a
time-series application, such as weather monitoring, ki may
represent a time-stamp value while vi a temperature reading.
For a time-series data stream, i.e. D =
〈(0, v0), (1, v1), (2, v2), ..〉, we define a data window,
denoted as w(s, e), as a sequence of data values whose
keys are in between a starting index s and an ending index
e. That is: w(s, e) = 〈 vi | s ≤ i < e〉. A non-overlapping
sliding window — denoted as sw(α, β) — is a sequence
of non-overlapping data windows starting from index α,
having size β. More precisely, the ith sliding window is
sw(α, β)[i] = w(α ∗ i, α ∗ i+ β).
B. Access Control Model.
An access control policy is defined by the data that an
authorized user can read. We consider two types of policies:
trigger and sliding window. In the former, the user is granted
access to a tuple (ki, vi) (i.e. it can read the value vi) if
ki is equal to or exceeds a threshold θ. Denote τ(θ, op) as
the trigger policy, where θ is a threshold value and op is a
comparison operator, then:
τ(θ, op) = 〈 vi | ki op θ = true 〉
In a sliding window policy, an user can only access the
averages of the data tuples that constitute a non-overlapping
3sliding window. In other words, the user cannot read individual
data tuples, but only the summaries. Denote pi(α, β) as the
sliding window policy with α being the starting index and β
being the window size, we have:
pi(α, β) = 〈
∑
v
β
| v in sw(α, β)[i]; i = 1, 2, ..〉
As an example, suppose a data owner is to share a weather
database containing temperature readings collected at five-
minute intervals starting from time 0. A sliding window policy
may require that the user can only access the average temper-
ature every 1 hour, starting from time 3. This corresponding
to the policy pi(3, 12), meaning that the user can only read the
averages of the windows [3− 14], [15− 26], [27− 38], etc.
C. Trust Model
We assume that data owners are honest. They outsource
data streams to the cloud and wish to protect privacy of their
data against the cloud. They define access policies for a set
of users and wish to enforce the policies in a secure manner
that does not permit unauthorized data access. The cloud is
not trusted in that it tries to learn sensitive information in the
data, and may collude with rogue users in order to provide
them unauthorized access to the data. However, the cloud is
trusted to carry out computations delegated to it by the owners
and users. This means it does not skip or distort computations.
A data user may be dishonest, in which case he attempts to
gain unauthorized access, for which he may collude with the
cloud. Finally, we assume that users do not collude with each
other (we explain the reason for this assumption shortly).
D. System Design Goals
Given the models above, we now state informally the goals
that our system aims to achieve.
Goal 1 (privacy). The cloud cannot learn the outsourced
data in plaintext.
Goal 2 (access control, trigger). An user given access ac-
cording to the policy τ(θ, op) cannot access values belonging
to another policy τ(θ′, op′) where θ 6= θ′ or op 6= op′.
Goal 3 (access control, sliding window). An user given
access according to the policy pi(α, β) cannot access values
belonging to any different policy. Specifically, the user cannot
see the values belonging to pi(α′, β′) where α′ < α or
α′ 6= α mod β. This means the user does not have access
to data windows starting before α. He can access windows
starting from later indices, but those indices must be a multiple
of α, which is the same as skipping a number of windows.
Moreover, the user cannot see the values defined by pi(α′, β′)
where β′ < β or β′ 6= 0 mod β. This means the user cannot
access data at finer granularity, nor can it access windows
whose sizes are not multiples of β. For instance, if an user
is given access to windows of size 5, he must not be able to
access windows of size 3 or size 7. It is worth noticing that
the assumption about users not colluding with each others
is necessary to achieve this goal. If two users with pi(α, β)
and pi(α, β′) where β 6= 0 mod β′ collude, they can derive
windows of size |β − β′| or even windows of size 1.
Goal 4 (scalability). Most of the expensive computation
should be off-loaded to the cloud. The protocols involving the
data owners and users should be light-weight.
III. THE PROTOCOLS
A. Overview
Our protocols for both trigger and sliding window policies
consist of 3 phases, as illustrated in Figure 1. First, the data
owner and user negotiate an access control policy which can be
either a trigger or sliding window policy (negotiation phase).
Next, the data owner encrypts its data and sends it to the
cloud (outsourcing phase). Upon receiving the ciphertexts, the
cloud performs transformation on the ciphertexts and forwards
the results to the authorized users (relaying phase). The users
receive messages from the cloud and decrypt them to obtain
the plaintext data.
A naive approach would be for the data owner to generate
one encryption key for each policy, share this key to the
authorized users, and encrypt the data using this key. This
does not scale for two reasons. First, the amount of duplicated
data that must be encrypted grows linearly with the number
of policies. Second, for a sliding window policy pi(α, β),
the owner has to transform the data locally and update the
encrypted version to the cloud. This process must be done for
every combination of α and β.
In our protocol, there is only encrypted copy of the data
stored at the cloud for the trigger policies, and up-to w
copies for sliding window policies where w is the number
of unique window sizes. To this end, we make use of three
important cryptographic primitives: attribute-based encryption
(ABE), proxy re-encryption (PRE) and additive homomorphic
encryption (AHE). ABE is used to enforce threshold condi-
tions specified in trigger policies, as well as the condition on
the starting index in sliding window policies. PRE is used by
the cloud to transform ABE ciphertexts to simpler ciphertexts
that can be decrypted by users. The aims of this transformation
is to relieve the users from carrying out expensive operations
involving ABE. For sliding window policies, AHE enables
the cloud to compute the encrypted aggregates of the data
windows over the encrypted text without breaking data privacy.
B. Cryptographic Primitives
1) Attribute Based Encryption.: Attribute-Based Encryp-
tion (ABE) schemes produce ciphertexts that can only be
decrypted if a set of attributes satisfies certain conditions (or
policies). Two types of ABE exists: key-policy ABE [23]
(KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy ABE [14] (CP-ABE). In both
cases, a policy is expressed as an access structure over a set of
attributes. For example, if the policy is defined as the predicate
T = a1 ∧ (a2 ∨ a3), then T ({a1}) = T ({a2, a3}) = false,
T ({a1, a2}) = T ({a1, a3}) = true. The plaintext can be
recovered only if evaluating the policy over the given attributes
returns true.
In KP-ABE, the message m is encrypted with a set of
attributes A and an access structure T is embedded in a decryp-
tion key. In CP-ABE, T is embedded within the ciphertext and
4the user is given a set of attribute A. In both cases, decryption
will succeed and return m if T (A) = true. KP-ABE and CP-
ABE are based on secret sharing schemes that generate shares
in a way that the original secret will only be reconstructed if a
certain access structure is satisfied. Constructions of KP-ABE
and CP-ABE for any linear secret sharing scheme (modelled
as a span program) are described in [23], [14]. In practice, the
schemes rely on threshold tree structures for secret sharing, in
which non-leaf nodes are threshold gates (AND and OR).
We adopt KP-ABE in our work, which is more suitable
than CP-ABE, because the attributes are based on the plaintext
message (the key value k). Although KP-ABE and CP-ABE
are similar and in some cases can be used interchangeably,
the former is more data-centric (concerning the question of
who gets access to the given data), whereas the latter is more
user-centric (concerning the question of which data the given
user has access to). For the trigger policy τ(θ, op) we encrypt
(ki, vi) using KP-ABE with ki as the attribute and k op θ =
true as the policy. Similarly, for the sliding window policy
pi(α, β), we encrypt (ki, vi) using ki as the attribute and k ≥ α
as the policy.
Since the policies involve arithmetic comparison, we make
use of the bag-of-bits method that translates an integer into a
set of attributes. For example, with 64-bit integers, an attribute
3 can be mapped to {x..x1x, x..x1}, and the policy k ≥ 11
can be mapped into (ge2exp4 ∨ ge2exp8 ∨ ge2exp16 ∨
ge2exp32)∨(x..1xxx ∧ (x..1xx ∨ (x..x1x ∧ x..xx1))) where
ge2expm is an attribute representing values greater than or
equal to 2m. It can be seen that a policy involving equality
condition often involves more attributes than a policy with an
inequality condition.
2) Proxy Re-Encryption.: A Proxy Re-Encryption scheme
(PRE) [15] enables a third-party to transform one ciphertext
to another without learning the plaintext. Using a transfor-
mation key KU→V it can convert c = Enc(KU ,m) to
c′ = Enc(KV ,m) which can be decrypted with KV , without
learning m. Traditional PRE schemes have been used for
distributed file systems, in a way that saves the data owner
from having different copies of the same data for different
users. In this work, we extend a recent proxy-based ABE
scheme [24] which can transform a KP-ABE ciphertext into
a Elgamal-like ciphertext whenever the access structure is
satisfied. This scheme has the benefit of traditional PRE
schemes, and it relieves users from expensive computations
involving ABE.
3) Additive Homomorphic Encryption.: Sliding window
policies require that authorized users have access to the
averages of data values within non-overlapping windows.
To allow for such an aggregate operation over ciphertexts,
the encryption scheme must be additively homomorphic, i.e.
Enc(K,m1) ⊕ Enc(K,m2) = Enc(K,m1 + m2) for an
operator ⊕. Paillier [32] is one of such schemes, which is
based on composite residuosity classes of group ZN2 where
N is at least 1024-bit.
In this work, we use an Elgamal-like encryption scheme to
achieve additive homomorphism, which can also be integrated
Data owner Cloud Data user
α, β, transformation key TK, user decryption key K
α, β, TK
Negotiation Phase
ki, ci = ABE Enc(vi, {ki})Outsourcing Phase
Ci ← Transform(ci, TK) for ti ≥ αRelaying Phase
Wj ← ComputeSum(Cj , Cj+1, .., Cj+β−1); j ← i
Wj
Dec(K,Wj)
Fig. 2: High-level protocol
with ABE. Essentially, consider a multiplicative group Zp
with generator g. For m ∈ Zp, K and r as random values
of Zp, then Enc(K,m) = (gr, gm.gr.K). The homomor-
phic property holds, because Enc(K,m1).Enc(K,m2) =
Enc(K,m1 + m2). The drawback of this scheme is that
decryption requires finding the discrete logarithm of gm in
base g. As in other works using a similar scheme [20],
[26], [39], we assume that the plaintext domain is finite and
small so that discrete logarithms can be computed by brute-
force [33] or even pre-computed and cached. For many types
of applications where data values belong to a small set (such
that temperature values), this is a reasonable assumption. Note
that the security is not compromised due to the mapping of
gm to m, which merely acts as an additional layer used to
achieve homomorphism.
To prevent a user from learning the individual values
constituting a window, we introduce a blind factor into the
ciphertext, which can only be removed when a proper number
of ciphertexts are put together. Suppose the windows are of
size 2, the owner generates δ1, δ2 randomly and give σ =
δ1 + δ2 to the user. The ciphertext c1 = (gr1 , gm.gr1+δ1+K)
and c2 = (gr2 , gm2 .gr2+δ2+K) cannot be decrypted individ-
ually, since δ1 and δ2 are unknown to the user. However,
c1.c2 = (X = g
r1+r2 , Y = gm1+m2 .gK(r1+r2+δ1+δ2)) can be
decrypted by computing gm1+m2 = Y
XK .gσ.K
and recovering
m1 + m2 by taking its discrete logarithm. In our protocol,
the user only needs to know σ for the starting window, with
which the unblind factors for the subsequent windows can be
efficiently computed.
C. Protocol for Sliding Window Policies
Figure 2 illustrates the high-level protocol for sliding win-
dow policies. In the negotiation phase, data owner and user
agrees on the sliding window parameters α, β. The owner
generates an access tree T for the condition k ≥ α, a
transformation key TK and a decryption key K for the user. It
sends (α, β, TK,K) to the user and (α, β, TK) to the cloud.
For every tuple (ki, vi), the owner encrypts vi using KP-ABE
with attribute ki. Each tuple is encrypted ω times, each for
a different window size β and using a different blind factor.
During the relaying phase, the cloud selects ciphertexts whose
attribute is greater or equal to α, and transforms them using
TK into other ciphertexts that can be decrypted with another
5key K ′ (K 6= K ′). Every β of the transformed ciphertexts are
used as inputs to the ComputeSum function which produces
an encrypted sum value which can be decrypted using K.
Our protocol relies on the properties of bilinear maps for
security. Let G,G1 be two multiplicative groups of prime order
p, g be the generator of G. e : G×G→ G1 is a bilinear map
if it is efficiently computable, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)a.b for u, v ∈
G and e(g, g) 6= 1. Given random group elements ga, gb, gc,
it is difficult to compute e(g, g)abc (Computational Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman Assumption). Also, it is difficult to distinguish
e(g, g)abc from a random element e(g, g)z (Decisional Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman Assumption).
Negotiation phase. During setup, all parties agree on
a security parameter λ. Let U be the attribute universe,
i.e. U = {x..x0, x..x1, x..0x, ...}. The owner chooses a
master secret value y ∈ Zp, and other secret t1, t2, ..t|U |.
For every window size β, it generates a set of random
values R = {r0, r1, .., rβ−1}. The public key contains
e(g, g)y, gt1 , gt2 , .., gt|U| .
Let u be an user with a sliding policy pi(α, β). The owner
generates a random value zu ∈ Zp. Next, the policy k ≥ α is
converted into an access tree whose leaves are the bag-of-bit
representation of k, as explained in [23]. Every non-leaf node
is a threshold gate: an AND node is a 2-out-of-2 threshold
gate, an OR node is a 1-out-of-2 gate. This tree is used to
share the master secret y. For a node x with threshold dx,
choose a random polynomial qx of degree dx − 1 (so that
xd points are needed to reconstruct the polynomial). For the
root node, set qr(0) = y. For any other node, set qx(0) =
qparent(x)(index(x)) where qparent(x) is the polynomial of
x’s parent and index(x) is the node index. The leaf node x
associated with an attribute i is given the value Dx = g
qx(0)
zu.ti .
For the policy pi(α, β), the owner computes:
σ(α, β) =
β−1∑
j=0
2d(α+j)/βeR[α+ j mod β]
Finally, the user is sent
(α, β, {Dx}, (zu, σ(α, β)))
where {Dx} and (zu, σ(α, β)) are the transformation and user
decryption keys respectively.
Outsourcing phase. To encrypt (k, v) ∈ D, the data owner
first translates k into bag-of-bit attributes Bk. Next, it chooses
a random value sk ∈ Zp and computes E′i = gti.sk for all
attribute i ∈ Bk. It also computes:
E(k, v) = gv+2
dk/βe.R[k mod β].e(g, g)y.sk
Finally, the following ciphertext is forwarded to the cloud:
ck = (k,Bk, E(k, v), {E′i})
Relaying phase. The transformation proceeds recursively
as follows. When x is a leaf node associated with attribute i:
Transform(x) =
{
e(Dx, E
′
i) = e(g, g)
sk.qx(0)
zu when i ∈ Bk
⊥ otherwise
When x is a non-leaf node, we call Transform(w) for all
w that are x’s children. Let ∆i,S(x) =
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
x−j
i−j be the
Lagrange coefficient for an element i ∈ Zp and S ⊆ Zp. Let
Fw be the output of Transform(w), and Sx be the set of x’s
children such that Fw 6= ⊥. If Sx = ∅, return ⊥. Otherwise:
Fx = Transform(x)
=
∏
w∈Sx
F
∆index(w),S′x (0)
w where S′x = {index(w) |w ∈ Sx}
= e(g, g)sk.qx(0)/zu
By calling Transform on the root node of the access tree,
we obtain Transform(rootk) = e(g, g)y.sk/zu . Let Ck =
(E(k, v),Transform(rootk)). For the ith window, the cloud
has to gather the full set of C = {Ck, Ck+1, .., Ck+β−1} for
k = α+ i.β. Then, it executes ComputeSum as follows:
(E1, E2) = ComputeSum(C) =
β−1∏
j=0
Ck+j
= (
β−1∏
j=0
E(k + j, vk+j),
β−1∏
j=0
Transform(rootk+j))
and sends (i = k−αβ , E1, E2) to the user.
Having received this message from the cloud, the user
computes:
wi =
E1
Ezu2
=
E(k, v).E(k + 1, v1)..E(k + β − 1, vβ−1)
(e(g, g)y.sk/zu ..e(g, g)y.sk+β−1/zu)zu
=
g(vk+..+vk+β−1)+2
i.σ(α,β).e(g, g)(sk+..+sk+β−1).y/zu
(e(g, g)(sk+..+sk+β−1).y/zu)zu
= g(vk+..+vk+β−1)+2
i.σ(α,β)
Finally, the average is computed as:
avgi =
discreteLog( wi
g2i.σ(α,β)
)
β
=
vk + ..+ vk+β−1
β
D. Protocol for Trigger Policy
The protocol for trigger policies is very similar to that for
sliding window. Its main differences are that the access policies
may involve other conditions besides ≥ as in sliding window,
and that no blind factor is needed since authorized users can
access individual data tuples.
During the negotiation phase, the owner create the pub-
lic key containing e(g, g)y, gt1 , gt2 , .., gt|U| as before. Next,
the access structure for the policy k op θ is constructed.
The transformation key contains {Dx} for all leaf node x,
and the user decryption key is zu. During the outsourc-
ing phase, a ciphertext sent to the cloud is generated in
the same way as with sliding window policy, except for
E(k, v) = gv.e(g, g)y.sk . During transformation, the cloud
computes Transform(rootk) = e(g, g)y.sk/zu as before
and sends Ck = (E(k, v),Transform(rootk)) to the user,
who decrypts it by taking the discrete logarithm of gv =
E(k,v)
(Transform(rootk))zu
.
6E. Discussions
Security. The protocols described above provide data pri-
vacy with respect to the cloud, because we use an encryption
scheme which is an extension of the proxy-based ABE scheme
proposed in [24]. As shown in [24], the scheme is Replayable-
CCA (or RCCA) secure. Our encryption is secure in the
standard model (as opposed to security in random oracle
model), since we use the small-universe construction of ABE.
The access control property for trigger policies hold as a
result of ABE. For sliding window policies, we now discuss
an informal proof showing that unauthorized access is not
possible. Particularly, we need to show that an user given
access according to a policy pi(α, β) cannot decrypt values
belonging to other policies pi(α′, β′) where α′ < α, β′ < β,
α′ 6= α mod β or β′ 6= 0 mod β. Since the ciphertext is
encrypted with the attribute k and the policy embedded in the
transformation key requires k ≥ α, the Transform operation
will fail for k < α. Thus, the user is prevented from learning
the values in pi(α′, β′) for α′ < α. From σ(α, β), one can
infer the value σ(α′, β) for α′ > α and α′ = α mod β,
since σ(α′, β) = 2α
′/α.σ(α, β). However, for α′ 6= α mod β,
deriving σ(α′, β′) from σ(α, β) is not possible as it requires
knowing the sum of a subset of R. Therefore, the user cannot
recover the plaintext because the unblind factors are incorrect.
This similarly holds when β′ < β or β′ 6= 0 mod β, because
computing the blind factors σ(α′, β′) in these cases requires
knowing individual values of R.
Scalability. The most expensive cryptographic operations
are exponentiations and pairings. The latter are done only by
the cloud during transformation. The number of pairings is
proportional to the size of the access tree. Notice that the
access tree is likely to be smaller for a sliding window policy
than for a trigger policy, as there is a smaller number of
attributes involved in constructing k > x than in constructing
k = x. Without the cloud, the user will have to perform these
pairings themselves. Instead, in our protocol, the user only
performs simple operations such as inversion, multiplication,
and only one exponentiation. Having to find discrete logarithm
during decryption is a potential bottleneck. But as discussed
earlier, we assume the data value domain is known and finite,
hence the user may pre-compute the discrete logarithm, thus
reducing this problem into a simple table look-up. If m is the
maximum value that v can take, the look-up table has the size
of m for trigger policies, and b.m for sliding policies where
b is the maximum window size.
The data owner’s computations are during the negotiation
phase and the outsourcing phase. Public and master key are
generated only once, hence the cost will amortize over time.
Generation of transformation keys is done once per policy.
Compared to data encryption during the outsourcing phase,
this operation is much less frequent and can be considered
as a constant. Thus to say, the overall setup cost is a one-off
cost which amortizes over time. During the outsourcing phase,
the owner performs one encryption per data value for trigger
policies, and w encryptions for sliding window policies (w
being the number of window sizes). The cost per encryption
is roughly the same for both trigger and sliding policies, and
is dominated by the cost of 2 + b exponentiations.
There are overheads incurred when storing the ciphertexts
in the cloud. First, ABE encryption introduces overheads that
are proportional to the number of attributes per ciphertext.
These overhead are constant in our protocol, because the
number of attributes is fixed at b. Second, the data owner may
wish to support sliding window policies of different window
sizes, which entails storing multiple ciphertexts for the same
data value at the cloud. However, when encrypting (k, v) for
different values of β only E(k, v) will be different. As a result,
the overhead is limited to w.||G|| where ||G|| is the number
of bits per group element.
IV. ACCESS CONTROL MANAGEMENT
Before starting Transform operation, the cloud checks
if the attributes associated with the ciphertext satisfy the
access structure associated with the policy. This is to avoid
performing redundant transformations which return ⊥. As
the number of streams and policies increase, management
and matching of policies must be done in a systematic and
scalable manner. To this end, we adopt a holistic approach
that leverages XACML framework, allowing the data owner to
specify access control policies in XML format. It also provides
a unified framework for managing policies at the cloud, for
defining access control requests and matching them against
the policies. Traditionally, XACML is used for access control
in trusted domains, such as internal systems or in trusted
collaborations. Our work utilizes XACML solely for policy
management and not for access control enforcement. The latter
is instead realized by our cryptographic protocols.
A. XACML
XACML is an OASIS framework for specifying and enforc-
ing access control [4]. It defines standards for writing policies,
requests, matching of requests against policies and interpreting
the response. Here, we briefly explain the main components
of XACML, more details can be found in [4].
Requests in XACML are written in XML, which contain
subject credentials and the system resources being accessed.
Subjects and resources are specified in the Attribute elements
included in the Subjects and Resources element respectively.
Each policy in XACML contains a Target and a set of Rules.
A Target element consists of a set of matching rules that
must be met by the request before the rest of the policy
can be evaluated. The XACML framework comprises two
main components: a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and a
Policy Decision Point (PDP). Requests are sent to PEP which
translates them to canonical forms before sending to PDP.
It interprets responses from PDP and sends the results back
to the users. Policies are loaded into and managed by PDP.
After receiving well-formed requests from PEP, it evaluates
them against the loaded policies and sends the well-formed
responses back to the PEP.
7<Subjects> <Subject>
<SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">9</AttributeValue>
<SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="pCloud:subject:key-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"/>
</SubjectMatch>
</Subject> </Subjects>
<Resources> <Resource>
<ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">0</AttributeValue>
<ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="pCloud:resource:streamId"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource> </Resources>
Fig. 3: Policy for sliding window, α = 9
<Subject>
<Attribute AttributeId="pCloud:subject:key-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">
<AttributeValue>3</AttributeValue></Attribute>
</Subject>
<Resource>
<Attribute AttributeId="pCloud:resource:streamId"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">
<AttributeValue>0</AttributeValue></Attribute>
</Resource>
Fig. 4: Request, k = 3
B. Using XACML With Our Protocols
In traditional settings, resource owners write XACML poli-
cies and upload them to a access control server. Users inter-
ested in the resource write XACML requests and submit them
to the server, where they are evaluated by the PDP. If the
decisions are Permit, the users are granted access.
In our setting, the cloud acts as the access control server and
runs an XACML instance. Each data stream is represented as a
resource. The data owner writes XACML policies representing
the trigger or sliding window policies. For each policy, the
cloud maintains a list of users to which the policy is given. The
user does not have to write or submit XACML requests to the
cloud. Instead, it is the owner who specifies XACML request
for every ciphertext it sends to the cloud. Specifically, the
request generated for the tuple (k, v) contains the value of k in
the Subject element. Once received at the cloud, it is evaluated
against the loaded policies. The result is a set of matching
policies and a set of users to whom access to the value v
should be granted. Figure 3 illustrates an XACML policy for
sliding window policies where α = 9. Figure 4 shows a request
constructed for the tuple (k, v) where k = 3. When evaluated,
the PDP will return a Deny decision, and hence the cloud will
not perform transformation for the ciphertext of this tuple.
V. PROTOTYPE AND EVALUATION
A. Prototype Implementation
We implement a prototype1 demonstrating the feasibility
of the proposed approach and to benchmark the various
components under simple settings. We extend the KP-ABE
implementation from [2], which uses PBC library [5] for
pairing operations. Our extensions mainly concern sliding
window policies, which include functions for the Transform
operation and for computing the encrypted sums at the cloud.
We use a Java implementation of XACML [8] for managing
and matching of policies. The communication between data
owners, the cloud and users is implemented in Java, using
sockets and one-thread-per-connection concurrency model.
1The source code is available at https://code.google.com/p/streamcloud/
B. Microbenchmark
We set up simple experiments to investigate the costs of the
main operations in our protocols. For each operation, we use
latency as a metric for measuring computation cost, which is
also representative of the overhead caused by the operation.
We use the fastest pairing implementation for our experi-
ments (type A [5]), whose base field size is 512 bits. There is
one data owner sending one stream of data with a certain rate.
There is one data user, to whom the owner specifies either
a trigger policy or a sliding policy (but not both). We fix the
sliding window size to 5 and the maximum data value to 1000,
which implies that the maximum sum of a window is 5000.
For trigger policies, we set op to be equality comparison. Our
experiments are run on 3 machines, two desktop machines
running as the owner and the user, and one laptop running
as the cloud. Each desktop has 2 2.66Ghz DuoCore CPUs
and 4GB of RAM running Ubuntu Linux. The laptop has
2.3Ghz Core i5 CPU, 4GB of RAM and run Snow Leopard.
All machines are connected via university LAN network.
Figure 5 depicts the costs of cryptographic operations. The
setup cost for data owner is the highest, since it involves
generating public parameters and transformation key. This cost
dominates the setup time at the user. Recall that this is a one
time cost, and hence does not affect run time performance
or practicality of the approach. The cost for sliding window
policies is slightly smaller than for trigger policies, because
the transformation keys in the former are of smaller sizes (as
discussed in the previous section). Another significant cost in
the setup phase is the cost of pre-computing the look-up table
for discrete logarithms of values in [0, 5000]. The setup time
at the cloud is much smaller, because it only needs to read and
initialize the public and transformation keys from byte arrays.
The cost per encryption is the same for both sliding window
and trigger policies (as predicted in the previous section),
which is around 179(ms). We believe this cost is reason-
able, especially considering that data streams in reality often
generate data in very long intervals (in the order of seconds
or even minutes). The transformation cost at the cloud for
trigger policies is orders of magnitude larger than for sliding
window policies. This is because transformation for the policy
k = θ requires 64 pairings, whereas for policy k ≥ α only 1
pairing is needed for large values of k. The maximum latency
is around 120(ms), which we also consider as reasonable.
Decryption cost at the user is an order of magnitude smaller
than transformation at the cloud, which further illustrates the
benefit of outsourcing bulk of the computation to the cloud.
In order to understand the overhead of encryption with
respect to the user-perceived latency, we measure the elapsed
time between decrypted values at the user. For trigger policies,
we fix k to be the same as θ, so that the the user has access
to all the data. Figure 6 shows the inter-arrival time at the
user. There exists a lower-bound on this metric when we
increase the sending rates (by decreasing the send intervals).
This boundary is exactly at the cost per encryption. This is
expected since encryption becomes the bottleneck at the data
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owner for high sending rates. Finally, we investigate the cost
of running the XACML framework. We upload a large number
of policies and send matching requests to the cloud. The cost
for policy matching is depicted in Figure 7, which is small and
scale gracefully with more policies. It suggests the system’s
scalability for large numbers of policies, streams and users.
VI. RELATED WORK
Existing works on access control for stream data assume
trusted domains and focus on the specification and enforce-
ment of access policies [17], [16], [30]. They are different
to our work which considers outsourcing access control to
an untrusted environment. Similarly, previous works that use
XACML for fine-grained access control have also focused on
trusted domains [21]. We use XACML only for policy manage-
ment, and rely on encryption schemes for policy enforcement.
When the cloud is untrusted, systems such as CryptDb [34]
and LLP [26] proposed systems that guarantee data privacy
while still enabling meaningful, database-related queries on
ciphertexts. Our work also provides data privacy, i.e. the cloud
cannot learn plaintext values, but it focuses on the question of
who can access the data and what the access granularity is. Ac-
cess control on untrusted environment have been investigated
in [27], [41], both of which deal with archival data. Our use of
ABE allows for more flexible, fine-grained access control than
in [27]. The system proposed in [41] also employs KP-ABE
and the cloud as a proxy, but it does not work with stream data,
nor does it support sliding window policies. Furthermore, the
cloud’s main role in [41] is during key revocation requiring
data re-encryption, and unlike in our work, the cloud does not
alleviate the users from expensive computations.
Attribute-Based Encryption schemes are being actively re-
searched [31], [41], [23], [14], [29]. Our protocols can be
viewed as an extension of the proxy-based ABE scheme [24].
Compared to the original work, we have built a system that
support meaningful access control policies for stream data. We
have additionally integrated XACML framework for access
control management. Finally, we have provided a holistic
prototype implementation and preliminary evaluation for the
encryption scheme as well as for the system as a whole.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a system that allows secure
and scalable outsourcing of access control to the cloud. Our
system works with stream data for which access control
is more complex than archival data. We have extended an
Attribute-Based Encryption scheme to support trigger and
sliding window policies. We have employed the cloud as a
computational proxy which performs the expensive crypto-
graphic operations on behalf of the user. In particular, the
cloud transforms complex ABE ciphertexts into Elgamal-
like ciphertexts that are decrypted only by authorized users.
We have integrated the standard XACML framework to aid
policy management. Thus, our approach for access control
outsourcing is holistic and is able to scale for large numbers
of data streams and policies. Preliminary evaluation using a
prototype indicates not only the feasibility but also the benefits
of access control outsourcing.
9While we have presented a working system, showing a
proof-of-concept that outsourcing access control is feasible
and practical for stream data, there is much left for future
work. First, our current prototype is not capable of dealing
with large, concurrent workloads. Our immediate plan is to
either improve our prototype using event driven architecture
(SEDA [40]) as a replacement for our current one-thread-
per-connection concurrency model, or to use existing high-
throughput stream processing engines such as STREAM [7]
or Borealis [19] followed by experiments at larger scale (more
streams, more policies, more users, more cloud servers) over
a real cloud infrastructure.
The current system can be extended to support multi-
value streams by performing different encryptions for different
values. We have not considered access revocation, which in our
case requires the data owner to change the attribute set during
encryption. We plan to investigate if existing revocable KP-
ABE schemes [12] can be integrated in our work, especially if
they allows revocation to be outsourced to an untrusted cloud.
Other interesting extensions are to add support for policies
with negative attributes [31], and for encryption with hidden
attributes. The former allows for a wider range of access
policies, whereas the latter provides attribute privacy which
is necessary when encryption attributes are the actual data.
Finally, we would like to relax the trust assumption for the
cloud. Currently, the cloud performs all the computations del-
egated to it in an honest manner. However, a malicious cloud
which skips or distorts computations will greatly increase the
cost of security while maintaining a good service quality.
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